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RADICAL SCHOLARS, CONSERVATIVE
FIELD: PUTTING "CRITICAL TAX
SCHOLARSHIP" IN PERSPECTIVE
MICHAEL A. LIVINGsTON*
I. INTRODUCIEON
To understand critical tax scholarship, one has to know
something about tax scholarship. Tax scholars have long been both
ahead of and behind their peers in non-tax subjects. Rhetorically
they have always recognized the political character of taxation and
the difficulty of separating one's views on tax matters from more
general opinions about human nature or the character of a just
society.' In this respect, tax scholars were "critical" before the rest of
the legal academy. Yet tax scholars are a conservative breed, and-
while all admit the political character of taxation-in practice their
work tends to emphasize a series of rather dry and (to outsiders)
technical issues, and their style of argument stresses the search for
technically proficient, consensus solutions having appeal across the
political spectrum. In this respect, tax scholars lag behind their non-
tax colleagues, and their work has an almost anachronistic quality at
times, exacerbated by the relative isolation of tax scholars and their
tendency to teach only (or almost only) tax subjects
The paradoxical nature of tax scholarship means that critical tax
scholars face two challenges, one theoretical and the other practical.
The practical problem is that it simply may be difficult to find an
audience for their work. Within the tax field, critical scholarship is
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers-Camden School of Law; Visiting Professor,
Spring 1998, Cornell"Law School. J.D., 1981, Yale; A.B., 1977, Cornell. I would like to
thank David Roman and Kosha Vora for outstanding research assistance.
1. See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHiRELSTEiN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 5-6 (7th ed.
1994) (illustrating the inherently political and moral nature of tax policy by reciting
arguments Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton used to support their contrasting
philosophies regarding taxation).
2. On the nature and limitations of contemporary tax scholarship, see generally
Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role
of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 365, 370-94 (1998) (describing "traditional"
tax scholarship and the intellectual and political changes that have made such scholarship
increasingly problematic).
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likely to appear radical, even a bit outrageous, in nature and may
receive less attention than it would otherwise deserve. Yet to
outsiders-especially those on the political left, the same work may
appear tame or cautious in nature, and for these reasons, or because
of a more general lack of interest in tax issues, may once again
achieve less impact than it deserves. Thus, writing critical tax
scholarship can be a lonely experience, and whatever one says is
likely to prove upsetting to someone.
The theoretical challenge relates to the subject matter of tax
scholarship and its prevailing argumentative mode. Tax scholars
have traditionally evaluated tax policy from the perspectives of
horizontal equity (fairness as between similarly situated taxpayers),
vertical equity (fairness as between income classes), economic
efficiency, and simplicity or administrability.3 Critical scholarship
frequently and sometimes deliberately blurs these lines. Because
they assume that women and minorities suffer from a pervasive
disadvantage in American society, critical scholars tend to see tax
issues involving these groups as raising essentially vertical equity
concerns.4 Traditional scholars, who, when they have considered
these issues at all, have viewed them largely in horizontal equity
terms,5 may find these arguments unconvincing or incoherent.
Critical, and especially feminist, scholars likewise embrace a goal of
consciousness-raising and "deconstruction" of laws and institutions
that is altogether alien to tax scholarship.6 Finally, critical scholars
reject the underlying assumption of mainstream tax policy-the
existence and desirability of a capitalist, market economy--and they
thereby render the very categories of traditional discourse
unintelligible or obstructive of true understanding. Critical tax
3. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 18-
24 (11th ed. 1997) (describing the goals for a good income tax).
4. See, e.g., TAXING AMERICA (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996)
(collecting various articles that provide a "progressive" perspective on American tax
law). Taxing America's editors write that the anthology is devoted to "serious
consideration of how the tax system exacerbates marketplace discrimination against
traditionally subordinated groups." Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows,
Introduction to TAXING AMERICA, supra, at 2. The anthology's essays primarily address
"class issues and their implications in designing a fair tax base and rate structure." Id.
5. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1389 (1975) (providing a traditional, but impressive, discussion of family tax issues).
6. See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1986) (describing the goals of the critical legal studies ("CLS") movement).
7. See Brown & Fellows, supra note 4, at 4-10 (discussing the ways in which
adherence to a traditional, market-oriented structure keeps tax analysis from considering
methods of combating discrimination and economic exploitation).
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scholars may thus find themselves writing for two very different
audiences, having different goals and perspectives and using the same
words in different ways.
This Article evaluates critical tax scholarship, and Professor
Lawrence Zelenak's critique of it, in the context of these broader
themes. The Article argues that critical tax scholarship is best seen
not as a dangerous or even a particularly radical development, but as
one of a series of ways in which tax scholarship is emerging from its
long isolation and groping for a more constructive relationship with
the broader legal academy. More specifically, critical scholarship
marks an expansion of the traditional tax concept of progressivity or
vertical equity-that is, justice between richer and poorer classes of
taxpayers-to encompass disadvantage based on race, gender, and
other immutable characteristics, as well as disadvantage based purely
on income levels. That does not mean that critical tax scholarship is
always good or that it should not be subjected to the same scrutiny as
more traditional writing. It does mean that critical scholarship must
be seen in an appropriate context and that critiques of it based on
essentially horizontal equity arguments-in particular if the critiques
emphasize comparisons to "similarly situated" white males-are
likely to miss the point of such scholarship. A fair critique must also
take into account the non-tax as well as the tax goals of critical
scholarship, including the raising of consciousness on race and gender
issues and the effort to link tax issues to other issues of governmental
and non-governmental policy. Part of this Article will defend critical
tax scholars on these and other grounds.
While the approach outlined above suggests a certain empathy
for critical tax scholars, it contains an implicit warning. Critical
scholarship, in tax or other fields, cannot survive without a broader
revival of interest in social justice and distributive concerns. In the
tax field, this revival means rethinking the entire issue of
progressivity and vertical equity to consider the effects of increasing
income inequality, the rise of the global economy, and the
concentration of poverty among women, minorities, and recent
immigrant groups. For this to occur, traditional scholars must pay
greater attention to the issues raised by critical tax authors, and the
"crits," for their part, must begin to integrate their work into a
broader argument for distributive fairness. A compartmentalized
discourse, in which various groups advance separate complaints
about the tax code, is unlikely to produce needed changes. A more
unified discussion, organized around a revived concept of vertical
equity and combining the best of traditional and critical tax
1998] 1793
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scholarship, is much more likely to succeed. This Article is thus a
defense of some critical scholarship and also a plea for convergence
so that tax scholars can retain a broadly progressive vision of their
subject and avoid the ideological warfare that has plagued other
fields.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II provides an overview
of traditional tax scholarship, emphasizing scholarship that deals with
progressivity or vertical equity issues.8 Part III considers scholarship
specifically concerning gender issues and reviews Professor Zelenak's
critique of this scholarship.9 Part IV conducts a similar analysis of
critical race scholarship and Professor Zelenak's thoughts on it.10
Finally, Part V addresses the future of critical tax scholarship and the
need to integrate such scholarship with a broader discourse on
progressivity and vertical equity concerns."
II. ALL KINDS OF EQUALITY ARE EQUAL (BUT SOME ARE MORE
EQUAL THAN OTHERS): A VERY BRIEF TOUR OF TAX
SCHOLARSHIP
Before evaluating critical tax scholarship, we should pause to
consider its more conventional predecessor. Three features of
traditional tax scholarship are especially relevant for critical tax
scholars: its conservative (or at least mainstream) political bias; its
emphasis on economic analysis; and its tendency to divide issues into
rather neat, formal categories (horizontal equity, vertical equity,
economic efficiency, etc.) with progressivity or vertical equity
frequently being shortchanged in the process. 2 Each of these
features suggests a limitation that critical tax scholars have sought,
often effectively, to exploit. But each also suggests that there will be
substantial resistance to the critical challenge and that critical
8. See infra notes 12-29 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 30-82 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 83-104 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
12. Progressivity refers to the imposition of progressively higher tax rates on higher
levels of income, a regular feature of U.S. (and most foreign) income taxation.
Progressivity thus differs from vertical equity, a broader term that encompasses the entire
issue of fairness between income classes; one might, in theory, support vertical equity but
believe that it was best achieved by proportional or even regressive taxation and hence be
opposed to the progressivity concept. In practice, people who express a concern about
vertical equity are most frequently supporters of progressive taxation, and this Article
uses the terms interchangeably at several points. See generally Joseph Bankman &
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive
Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1907-08 (1987) (defining progressive, regressive, and
proportional or "flat" income taxes).
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scholars may have some difficulty establishing a dialogue with more
traditional experts.
The first point is a sociological rather than intellectual fact. Tax
at American law schools is a largely conservative (or at least non-
radical) field. Most tax professors come to teaching either from
private practice or government service, and they tend to pursue the
same issues-essentially, incremental tax reform proposals-that
they encountered in these venues. People who believe that the
capitalist system is unjust or oppressive, or that the government itself
lacks legitimacy, may find it difficult to get excited about these issues.
When such people do enter the field, they are often frustrated: After
writing one or more pieces exposing the alleged unfairness of the
existing tax system, they typically revert to more traditional subjects
or, if they remain unconverted, leave the field. 3 These tendencies
are exacerbated by the relative isolation of the tax field, which
insulates tax scholars from developments in the remainder of the
legal academy. Relatively few radicals remain very long in the tax
area, so that the label of "critical tax scholar" has an almost
oxymoronic feel.
The second point concerns the intellectual structure of the tax
field. When tax scholars move beyond purely legal materials, they
turn overwhelmingly to economics, and a rather old-fashioned
economics at that. 4 Relatively few tax scholars are conversant with
political science, philosophy, or the remaining non-economic social
sciences, or even with the long-term history of their own field.
Arguments based on these disciplines tend to be viewed as soft or
political in nature, as compared to the hard, "scientific" character of
13. A good example is the career of Mark Kelman, who criticized conventional tax
scholarship in a celebrated 1979 article, see Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions
Revisitek Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a
Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831 (1979) [hereinafter Kelman, Personal
Deductions Revisited], but quickly moved on to other areas, see, e.g., Mark G. Kelman,
Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Mark G. Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in
"General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157 (1991); Mark G. Kelman, Could
Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1215 (1993).
14. For a more complete treatment of this subject, see Livingston, supra note 2, at
374 (noting that the principal themes of tax scholarship are essentially economic in
origin).
15. One reason why tax scholars avoid the non-economic social sciences may be that
it is difficult to apply the findings of these fields in support of specific policy
recommendations. See STEPHEN G. UTz, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND
SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES 72 (1993) (noting that political scientists,
historians, and other social scientists typically deny that they are offering advice on
practical matters).
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economic analysis. 6 This situation presents a challenge for critical
scholars, who make frequent use of political argument and are often
concerned with categories such as race,' 7 gender,"8 or sexual
preference 9 that cut across economic lines. In particular, the
narrative or consciousness-raising aspect of critical legal studies is
likely to be alien to tax scholars. Critical tax scholars may
accordingly feel pressure to squeeze their arguments into more
recognizable forms of discourse, sacrificing much of their emotional
energy and perhaps some of their intellectual persuasiveness in the
process.
A third point-really, an extension of the second-relates to the
organization of the tax field. Tax scholars have traditionally divided
their concerns into three principal areas: horizontal equity (similarly
situated taxpayers ought to be taxed in a similar manner); vertical
equity (fairness between income classes); and economic efficiency or
the minimizing of distortion by the tax system.20 (A fourth area,
simplicity, is perpetually on the back burner.) In theory, these areas
are equal in importance. In practice, vertical equity tends to get less
attention than the remaining categories, at least where academic
lawyers are concerned.21 This difference in attention is reflected in
the choice of subject matter, with subjects emphasizing horizontal
16. See id. at 71 ("Tax policy writing often seems to ignore the historical forces that
condition and constrain the design of our tax laws.").
17. See, e.g., Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal
Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751.
18. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1987); Nancy C. Staudt,
Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. LJ. 1571 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Lias, 1 LAW' &
SEXUALITY 97 (1991).
20. See KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 3, at 18-24 (describing the goals for a good
income tax).
21. The emphasis on horizontal equity dates in part from the work of Henry Simons,
who influenced all later tax scholars and whose work emphasized horizontal equity issues.
See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS
A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 30-31, 106 (1938). It is also a matter of intellectual
cultures. Lawyers feel comfortable with horizontal equity, which is essentially a game of
competing analogies, and they are increasingly influenced by economists, whose work
emphasizes the measurement of economic efficiency and suggestions of how to achieve it.
Vertical equity has, by contrast, no obvious champion. It is hard (although not
impossible) to systematize a case for social justice, and one is always open to the charge
that one's views are merely a political opinion or that the issue is inherently subjective in
nature. Assessing the distributive impact of tax provisions may also require a large
volume of empirical data with which lawyers are uncomfortable working. On conflicting
goals in tax policy analysis, see generally William S. Blatt, The American Dream in
Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287, 299-
308 (1996).
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equity or efficiency concerns (for example, the tax treatment of
various forms of business enterprise) tending to receive more
extensive treatment than topics emphasizing vertical equity issues
(for example, personal deductions and credits or the tax treatment of
poorer taxpayers). It also is reflected in the academic approach to
these issues. For example, as Mark Kelman noted in a 1979 article,
medical and charitable deductions have historically been discussed
primarily as horizontal equity issues (that is, are medical and
charitable expenses more like consumption or reduced income?)
rather than vertical equity concerns (that is, are rich or poor people
more likely to benefit from these deductions?).' Discussions of
family tax issues similarly tend to emphasize horizontal equity
comparisons.' For example, such discussions might focus on a
comparison between one couple earning $50,000 and having no child
care expenses and another couple earning $60,000 but having $10,000
of such expenses, a classic horizontal equity issue. By contrast, at
least until recently, such scholarship was less likely to discuss the
consequences of different rules for richer and poorer families, and
least likely of all to consider the allocation of economic power within
the family unit.2 4
The categorization of tax discourse and the tendency to
emphasize horizontal equity or efficiency over vertical equity
concerns mean that critical tax scholars are unconventional in several
respects. By emphasizing topics like family taxation or the treatment
of poorer taxpayers, these scholars are focusing on areas that-while
hardly insignificant-are not subjects on which the leading tax
scholars typically have spent much time. By emphasizing distinctions
based on race, gender, and other non-economic criteria, they are
stepping outside the usual economic analysis and blurring the
distinction between horizontal and vertical equity arguments. It is
possible to squeeze these criteria into a horizontal equity model by
asking if the tax code discriminates between women or minorities and
similarly situated white males. Such analysis, however, fails to
capture the spirit of critical scholarship, the starting point for which is
the dissimilarity of status between gender and racial groups. Critical
tax scholarship also may be difficult to reconcile with the traditional
(and historically less prominent) vertical equity discourse, because
22. See Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited, supra note 13, at 835-79 (evaluating
tax deductions for medical expenses and charitable contributions).
23. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 5.
24. The vertical equity implications of family tax issues are discussed at some length
in EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 137-60 (1997).
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critical scholarship often assumes differential status for women and
men25 (or whites and nonwhites) 26 even at the same income level.
Thus, critical scholars sometimes appear to be speaking a different
language than their more traditional colleagues, making arguments
that straddle the usual categories and that lose much of their
emotional and logical force when scholars try to squeeze inside these
categories. This intellectual problem is exacerbated by the
argumentative style of critical scholars, who sometimes make
deliberately extreme proposals in order to stimulate debate and to
raise political consciousness with respect to their particular issues.27
Even if critical scholars are likely to find much of the tax
landscape discouraging or unfriendly, they have some compensating
advantages. Even conservative tax scholars recognize the inherently
political nature of their subject;28 the frequently heard objection to
critical legal studies-that it is attempting to "politicize" a previously
apolitical field29-- thus has relatively little weight in taxation. It is my
personal experience that tax scholars also tend to be supportive of
each other, even in disagreement, a likely response to years of
indifference from the remainder of the legal academy. Therefore,
critical tax scholars are likely to encounter little of the hostility that
greets similar scholars in other areas. The danger is less of being
attacked than of being ignored-making a series of provocative
insights that stimulate a brief debate but leaving traditional structures
essentially unchanged and the field at more or less the same place
from which it started.
III. FEMINIST CRITIQUES AND PROFESSOR ZELENAK'S RESPONSE
Against this background, feminists and other critical tax scholars
make two essential claims, one implicit and the other explicit in
nature. The implicit claim is that tax scholars should devote more
time to issues that have received relatively little attention in the past,
and less time to some more traditional subjects. In particular, the tax
25. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 18, at 1571-75 (emphasizing the role of women
specifically as primary familial care-givers).
26. See, e.g., Moran & Whitford, supra note 17.
27. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 18, at 1618-36 (proposing taxation of uncompensated
household services). Staudt's proposal, and criticisms of that proposal, are discussed
further infra in Part III.
28. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 1, at 5-6.
29. See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land,
36 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (1984) (describing CLS as "receptive to paternalistic coercion
to override the stated preferences of real human beings" and as advancing "[g]rotesque
proposals... without pragmatic basis or sensitivity to institutional issues").
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treatment of women, minorities, and poorer taxpayers deserves more
scholarly interest than it usually has received. In this claim, the
"crits" have been quite successful, and the existence of this
Symposium is a testament to that success.
The explicit claim is that the tax treatment of women, minorities,
and so forth is not merely a worthy subject, but a case study of the
subordination of these groups in the broader American society. Far
from being a passive observer, the tax system plays an important role
in this subordination, discouraging women from working outside the
home and adopting a male-centered worldview that systematically
slights female concerns." In racial matters the Internal Revenue
Code is similarly biased, discriminating against Blacks and in favor of
Whites even at the same income level.32 This race-based analysis is
predictably more controversial, and is the principal subject of
Professor Zelenak's essay 3
The explicit claim itself takes various forms, reflecting broader
divisions within the feminist movementY One group-what might
be called the reformist or moderate feminists35-remains more or less
within the traditional tax discourse, using conventional tax policy
criteria (fairness, efficiency, etc.), together with mainstream feminist
analysis, to critique the existing tax system and to evaluate proposals
for change. This group is generally willing to accept the good faith of
previous actors, albeit faulting their mistakes, and tends to make
incremental or at least not unrealistic policy proposals. Grace
Blumberg,36 Anne Alstott,37 and (most of the time) Edward
30. See Brown & Fellows, supra note 4, at 2 (arguing that the present tax system
exacerbates already existing societal discrimination against traditionally subordinated
groups).
31. See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of the
Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BuFF. L. REv. 49, 49 (1971)
(assessing the tax code's role in discouraging women from working outside the home).
32. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 17, at 799-803 (assessing evidence that the tax
code is systematically biased against Blacks).
33. Zelenak would be unlikely to deny the first observation-that is, that the tax
treatment of women is a worthy scholarly subject-as he himself has written extensively
on the subject of women taxpayers. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the
Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994).
34. I begin with feminism as the older and as yet more developed approach to the tax
code. Cf. infra Part IV (discussing race and tax issues).
35. See Introduction to FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 4-8 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993)
(distinguishing between moderate and radical factions of the feminist movement).
36. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 31.
37. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism, Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (1996).
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McCaffery 38 appear to be largely in this camp, although the lines
become blurry in some cases.
A second group-what might be called the radical or
revolutionary feminists-is more strident than the first. These
writers tend to adopt more extreme analyses and to make more
extreme proposals than the first group and are somewhat more
willing to question the motives (conscious or unconscious) of those
responsible for existing law. The styles of these two groups are also
different: Radical feminists tend to emphasize the narrative,
consciousness-raising side of feminism more than the reformists do
and are perhaps less careful to remain within existing tax categories.
Nancy Staudt3 9 and Mary Louise Fellows,4" together with many of the
participants in the Taxing America project,41 appear to be largely in
this group, although the lines blur in individual cases. 42
Not surprisingly, Professor Zelenak-a creative, but essentially
traditional tax scholar-agrees with the first category of feminists
more than the second. Among the many sins of which he accuses the
latter are an overeagerness to identify sexist provisions in the tax
code,43 a habit of making unrealistic and poorly thought-out
proposals," and a failure to recognize the diversity of feminist theory
and its sometimes conflicting policy prescriptions. 4 5  Zelenak
contrasts this carelessness with the work of Alstott, McCaffery, and
others that he finds more convincing, although he devotes relatively
little space to them. 6
Zelenak's criticisms are, of course, not unique. They are the tax
equivalent of the attacks that have been leveled for years at critical
38. See, e.g., MCCAFFERY, supra note 24; Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the
Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983
(1993).
39. See Staudt, supra note 18.
40. See Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers," 10
LAW & INEQ. J. 137 (1991).
41. See TAXING AMERICA, supra note 4.
42. The same authors sometimes revert to a more or less conventional approach in
dealing with other subject matters. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive
Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REV. 722, 810-11 (1990) (arguing that the current
practice of deferring taxation of certain gains until they are "realized" undermines the
fairness and allocative efficiency of the tax system and suggesting an alternative
approach).
43. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1521, 1523 (1998).
44. See id. at 1524.
45. See id. at 1523.
46. See id. at 1578 (describing as "impressive" the work of Alstott, McCaffery,
Blumberg, and other writers).
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(and especially feminist) legal scholars in fields far removed from
taxation.47 In essence, they boil down to the idea that critical scholars
elevate emotion over thought and political rhetoric over balanced
and reasoned analysis. Augmenting this idea-and here the special
history of the tax field becomes important-is the sense that the
radicals have broken the rules of tax scholarship, making politically
impractical proposals and failing to show adequate respect for
previous generations of tax scholars.48
These criticisms are not without force, and there are certainly
many degrees of quality in feminist (or any other) tax scholarship.
But categorizing others' scholarship is always a dangerous enterprise,
and Zelenak is perhaps too quick to dismiss several examples of
unconventional, but still effective, analyses. In particular, he almost
completely misses the narrative or consciousness-raising side of
feminist scholarship, the ability of an author to make us think about
gender in a different way than we did before, even if her proposals
are politically unrealistic or inconsistent with some versions of
feminist theory. His focus on the "tax" side of critical tax scholarship
sometimes blinds him to the "critical" aspect, and he misses the
feminist forest for the tax trees.
Nancy Staudt's study of housework provides a good example of
this aspect of feminist scholarship.49 Staudt's article addresses a
classic problem in feminist scholarship. In seeking better treatment
for working women, feminists may ignore or even hurt the large
number of women who work principally at home as child care
providers and performers of other domestic tasks. 0 To remedy this
oversight, Staudt proposes that the value of such housework be
included in the tax base and credited toward social security and other
benefits that are in some way tied to tax payments.51 The potential
regressivity of this tax would be reduced by a credit for lower-income
families, so that the tax would be imposed largely on middle- and
47. See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L.
RaV. 247, 248 (1984) ("[Hlere is a movement composed of supposedly radical law
professors who proudly proclaim themselves to be 'utopian,' and whose positive program
seems to contain nothing more substantial than an instinctive dislike for 'domination' and
hierarchy.' ").
48. See Blatt, supra note 21, at 301-04 (describing "pragmatic reconciliation" as the
dominant theme in tax policy).
49. See Staudt, supra note 18. Throughout the article, Staudt refers explicitly to
women as houseworkers rather than indulging (for her) the fiction that men and women
engage equally in this form of activity.
50. See id. at 1575.
51. See id. at 1618-36.
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upper-class households.52 According to Staudt, this proposal would
provide both a substantive benefit to the relevant women, in the form
of increased benefit levels, and a symbolic benefit, by assigning a
measurable value to housework rather than assuming that it is
without value or else performed as an obligation without expectation
of reward.53
Staudt's proposal flies in the face of traditional tax analysis,
which tends to be extremely skeptical about taxing imputed income,54
as well as most feminist analyses of the tax code, which emphasize
improved treatment for women who work outside the home.55 The
proposal is also unusual in that it proposes taxation of the very
group-houseworking women-that it wishes to help. As such, it is
an inviting target for criticism. Zelenak takes up the challenge,
criticizing Staudt for political unrealism (it is unlikely Congress
would enact such a proposal without significant changes),56 flawed
technical analysis (at least some of the intended beneficiaries would
not get benefits in excess of their additional tax burden, and others
might actually be hurt by the proposal),57 and failure to take adequate
notice of the differences among various strains of feminist theory. 8
Additional concerns are that Staudt's proposal may tend to
"commodify" women's activities and, on a more practical level, that
the proposal might provide an excuse for a further political assault on
stay-at-home (especially poorer, stay-at-home) women.
But unless Staudt is terribly naive, which is doubtful, she has no
illusion that her proposal will be enacted at any time in the
foreseeable future. Nor is she ignorant of the valuation problems in
taxing imputed income, or of the fact that most people view taxation
as a penalty rather than a prize. What Staudt is doing is classic
feminist consciousness-raising. By making a radical-but by no
means absurd-proposal to tax "non-working" women,59 she is
highlighting the ambiguities in the tax treatment of such women in a
way that a more incremental suggestion would not. Even if her
proposal is never enacted, this increased awareness might lead to
many new and provocative insights. For example, recognizing the
52. See id. at 1636-40.
53. See id. at 1573-74.
54. See KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 3, at 117-25 (discussing imputed income).
55. See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 31; McCaffery, supra note 38.
56. See Zelenak, supra note 43, at 1530-31.
57. See id. at 1529-38.
58. See id. at 1538-40.
59. See Staudt, supra note 18, at 1574, 1618-36.
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value of housework might make us more skeptical of proposals to cut
welfare and other programs for poorer women on the grounds that
such women are seeking benefits without providing anything of value
in return. Or, Staudt's proposal-an increased tax base coupled with
a credit for poorer families°---might help us to reconceptualize the
entire issue of family taxation as a matter of vertical rather than
horizontal equity, emphasizing the problems faced by both "working"
and "non-working" poor women rather than the traditional
comparison between two differently situated, middle-class families.
Such reconceptualizing is not incidental, but is a principal purpose of
feminist scholarship, which seeks to increase awareness of and
resistance to female subordination' and which has been regularly
accused of extremism or unrealism on that basis. 62  The
disproportionate attention that Staudt's article has attracted, as
exemplified by this Symposium, suggests that she has succeeded
rather well in this task.
Marjorie Kornhauser's work on progressive taxation provides a
similar example.63  Kornhauser's work proceeds from the
"difference" feminism of Carol Gilligan and other writers, which
suggests that women on average tend to be more communitarian and
to think more in terms of responsibility to others, while men on
average tend to be more individualist and to think in terms of their
own abstract rights.61 Since women are supposedly gaining power in
our society, one might expect the female outlook to be taken more
seriously in policy debates. Yet the tax debate-and with it, much of
the national political dialogue-appears to be going in an opposite
direction, emphasizing individualist values and cutting back on
precisely those programs that express a shared sense of responsibility
or commitment. The flat tax/progressive tax debate is a case in point:
The flat taxers, armed with a rhetoric of individual rights and
entitlements, appear everywhere on the offensive,6' and progressive
60. See id. at 1637.
61. See Introduction to FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 35, at 3.
62. See id. at 9-11 (discussing the feminist movement and male responses to that
movement).
63. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 18.
64. See id. at 507 n.136 (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982)).
65. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995)
(arguing for a flat or proportionate tax rate on fairness and efficiency grounds); cf.
Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Tax Policy for Post-Liberal Society: A Flat-Tax-Inspired
Redefinition of the Purpose and Ideal Structure of a Progressive Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 727, 775-77 (1985) (arguing that a flat tax with an expanded tax base and generous
exemption amount could result in tax burdens that are more progressive than under the
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taxation, which has traditionally been justified on communitarian
grounds, appears to be losing support. 6
To remedy this situation, Kornhauser proposes a link between
tax and feminist scholarship, designed to strengthen the case for
progressivity and perhaps encourage feminists to pay more attention
to the tax field.67 In part, this is a deconstructive project, exposing
the overwhelmingly male character of the flat tax movement and the
individualist assumptions of its prevailing "neo-conservative"
rhetoric.68 But Kornhauser also suggests a new argument in favor of
progressivity: It may be a relatively easy way of expressing a feminist
commitment to communitarian values at precisely the time that such
values are under attack in the broader society.69 More specifically,
progressive taxation may be a way of expressing the intermediate
level of commitment that we feel to individuals who are not our
immediate family or friends but who are part of the larger society
that makes our individual wealth and happiness possible." A
minimal level of community being necessary to the conduct of
economic activity, this vision of progressivity ought to be acceptable
even to those who adhere to a more male-oriented, neo-conservative
philosophy.7' At the very least, the debate is a different one once the
feminist perspective has been considered, and the argument is no
longer conducted in exclusively male terms.
An argument like Kornhauser's provides numerous
opportunities for disagreement, and Zelenak again obliges, noting
several perceived gaps in the argument and generally dismissing
Kornhauser's work as flawed and unconvincing. According to
Zelenak, Kornhauser over-generalizes about the nature of men and
women, there being no inevitable difference in male and female
worldviews, or at least no demonstrable differences in attitudes
toward progressive taxation.72 Even if women were more altruistic
current tax system).
66. See Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 465 ("The progressive income tax is currently
under siege.").
67. See id. at 491.
68. See id. at 485-90 (discussing rhetoric of the anti-progressive-tax movement).
69. See id. at 504-07.
70. See id. at 504-18 (setting forth "alternate vision" of progressivity based on
feminist principles).
71. See id. at 522 ("Paradoxically, the Neos [that is, neo-conservatives] must cultivate
this sense of community, or connectedness to others, in order to preserve and protect
their individualistic society.").
72. See Zelenak, supra note 43, at 1551-52. Zelenak further accuses Kornhauser of
misreading Gilligan concerning the persistence of gender differences in adult life and the
obligations owed to "nonproximate" strangers. See id. at 1551-53.
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than men, such altruism would not necessarily support an increase in
progressive taxation, but might be better reflected in a proportional
tax with high levels of charitable contributions by altruistically
inclined taxpayers.' Zelenak also notes that Kornhauser's argument
implicitly assumes that tax revenues will be used largely for
communitarian purposes, whereas a sizable portion is actually used
for defense and other activities. 74
But Kornhauser, like Staudt, surely realizes that men and
women are not homogeneous; she is making an argument based on
feminist theory, rather than an argument that all women will
necessarily support. Many of Zelenak's other criticisms-that
altruism is best expressed voluntarily,75 that there is no scientific basis
for preferring progressive to proportional taxation,76 and so forth-
are in fact criticisms of progressive taxation in general, and not of
Kornhauser's specific approach. He is clearly right that difference
feminism would require a reorientation of spending as well as tax
priorities, but Kornhauser never denies this. Rather, she limits her
analysis to tax issues for the sake of convenience,77 not because she
thinks only tax is important. Overall, her argument is rather
convincing; at the very least, she makes some provocative links
between tax and feminist scholarship and suggests a potential for
future scholarly exchanges.
Zelenak also misses a key implication of Kornhauser's article:
that feminist tax theory goes beyond family taxation and other
traditionally "female" tax problems. Her particular concern is
progressivity and the flat tax movement. But one can imagine
feminist critiques of numerous tax issues, and indeed of the very
structure of the tax field, which tends to adopt a rather rigid
distinction between the market and private spheres and assumes the
superiority of market to government solutions in ways that feminist
scholars may find quite problematic.7' The same is true of other
critical scholars, who may question the conceptual underpinnings of
tax law as well as the treatment of particular taxpayers. By defining
critical scholarship as essentially a movement of disgruntled
73. See id. at 1556.
74. See id. at 1554.
75. See id. at 1556.
76. See id. at 1553-54.
77. See Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 470.
78. See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1524 (1983) (criticizing the markettfamily dichotomy
and arguing that this prevailing worldview has limited the effectiveness and range of
feminist reform efforts).
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groups 79 -a misconception unfortunately shared by some critical
scholars-Zelenak threatens to trivialize the movement and miss
some of its potentially greatest contributions.
My objective here is not so much to defend Staudt or
Kornhauser, who are rather capable of defending themselves, as to
make a point about traditional tax scholarship and its own historic
thought patterns. If critical tax scholars are sometimes too eager to
identify bias in the tax system, traditional scholars have an equal or
greater tendency to downplay such evidence and to marginalize
scholarship that crosses traditional boundaries or refuses to play by
traditional rules. Traditional scholars tend to favor economic over
non-economic arguments and incremental solutions over radical
reevaluations, often labeling those on the wrong side of these
dichotomies as unrealistic or incoherent. 80 The danger is that many
new and creative approaches may be smothered by such responses. It
is no doubt important, as Zelenak argues,8 to retain high academic
standards and not to allow attractive political causes to become an
excuse for careless or inferior scholarship. But it is equally important
to examine our own ingrained thought patterns, and not to cut off
new inquiries at just the point at which they begin to bear fruit.82
79. See Zelenak, supra note 43, at 1569-70.
80. Professor Zelenak, for instance, argues:
The most serious problem [with critical tax literature is its advocates'] failure to
think through proposed solutions with sufficient care. The solutions are often
presented as afterthoughts, with minimal consideration of whether the author's
goal is best achieved through the tax system rather than through non-tax legal
reform... and with minimal consideration of whether the proposed tax solution
will have the desired effects.
Id at 1524 (footnotes omitted).
81. See id. at 1570.
82. The foregoing defense of Staudt and Kornhauser should not be taken to imply
that other critical tax scholars (for example, Alstott, McCaffery, or Blumberg) are in any
sense less convincing. There being a general agreement as to the value of these scholars'
work, it is simply less important (not to mention a good deal less fun) to talk about them.
Notably, Alstott makes many of the same points as Zelenak, especially regarding the
conflicting goals of different feminist approaches, albeit without the sometimes
oppositional flavor of Zelenak's article. See Alstott, supra note 37, at 2004 ("[A]ny
feminist tax proposal incorporates normative judgments about the best way to help
women, and none of these norms are uncontroversial, even among feminists.").
In the interest of space, this Article does not discuss several additional articles
mentioned by Zelenak, including Mary Louise Fellows's and Wendy Gerzog's work on
QTIP trusts, see Fellows, supra note 42; Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP
Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301 (1995), and
Gwen Thayer Handelman's article on return preparation standards, see Gwen Thayer
Handelman, Sisters in Law: Gender and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 3 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.. 39 (1993). Zelenak's critique of these authors suffers from many of the
same problems as his critique of Staudt and Kornhauser, although he is probably right
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IV. RACE, GENDER, AND THE PROBLEM OF VERTICAL EQUITY
Thus, the quality and originality of critical tax scholarship is
higher than Zelenak indicates, and at least some of his comments
reflect a time-honored but unduly narrow vision of the tax field. Yet
the question remains: Is this trip worth the effort? If issues like
progressivity, imputed income, and the taxation of married couples
can be discussed in gender- and race-neutral terms-and if the
addition of these considerations may sometimes preclude, rather than
facilitate, agreement-what exactly is gained from the new, critical
focus? Once our consciousness has been effectively raised, do the
benefits of critical tax scholarship exceed its probable costs?
This cost-benefit question becomes especially prominent when
we turn from gender to race issues. The work of Beverly Moran and
William Whitford provides a case in point.83 Moran and Whitford
study four aspects of the Internal Revenue Code: tax benefits for
wealth and wealth transfers (including the gift exclusion, reduced
capital gains rate, and realization requirement);84 tax benefits of
home ownership (including the deduction for mortgage interest and
taxes and various exclusion or rollover rules); 5 employee benefit tax
incentives;86 and the joint return marriage penalty.' According to the
authors, each of the first three items deviates from the ideal of a
comprehensive income tax, under which all economic income would
be taxed at essentially the same rate.8s Moran and Whitford argue
that all four aspects of the Code discriminate against African-
Americans, because African-Americans tend to own less of the
favored categories of assets and are more likely to have similar
incomes at the time of marriage, resulting in imposition of a
relatively high marriage penalty.8 9 Moreover, this discrimination
cannot be explained on solely economic grounds, because the
that it is more difficult to identify a pattern of gender discrimination in these areas of law.
See Zelenak, supra note 43, at 1543-49,1556-61.
83. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 17.
84. See id. at 759-72.
85. See id. at 773-83.
86. See id. at 783-91.
87. See id. at 791-99.
88. See id. at 753 ("Our hypothesis is that deviations from the ideal of a
comprehensive income tax systematically favor whites over blacks."); cf. Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955) (identifying congressional intent to tax all
sources of income not subject to clear statutory exception); SIMONS, supra note 21, at 6
(discussing taxation of economic income at a uniform rate).
89. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 17, at 800 ("Because of extensive participation
in the work force by black women, blacks are less likely to enjoy marriage bonuses and
more likely to incur marriage penalties.").
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relevant provisions treat Blacks worse than Whites even after
controlling for income differences.90  Thus, while Moran and
Whitford cannot yet conclude that the Code is systematically biased
against African-Americans, the evidence so far gathered lends
credence to that hypothesis.
Zelenak is predictably critical of Moran and Whitford's article,
which he faults on three different levels. First, Zelenak questions the
provisions that Moran and Whitford select to study, noting that other
provisions may be less unfavorable to African-Americans and some
may even discriminate in their favor.91 Second, he finds Moran and
Whitford excessively eager to focus on harm to African-Americans,
when under different assumptions the same provisions might be less
harmful or even have a beneficial effect.9 Finally, Zelenak criticizes
Moran and Whitford's proposed solutions, which he argues would not
solve the relevant problems and might actually make things worse for
Blacks in some cases.93 On a more conceptual level, Zelenak
questions Moran and Whitford's reliance on the comprehensive
income tax concept,94 which has been subject to serious academic
criticism95 and which tends to make any savings or investment
incentive look like an unwarranted tax expenditure. By contrast, had
the authors started with a consumption tax ideal, which excludes
90. See id. Moran and Whitford's work thus parallels studies of "environmental
racism," which suggest that Blacks are more likely than Whites to be subjected to
environmental hazards even at the same income level. See Robert W. Collin, Review of
the Legal Literature on Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity, and Environmental
Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 121, 139 (1994); Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The
Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 723 (1993) (review essay). Why
it is important to demonstrate the existence of race and not "merely" class
discrimination-as if it is acceptable to hurt poor black people so long as you hurt poor
white people, too-has never been clear to me, but may have something to do with the
nature of anti-discrimination laws, which prohibit discrimination based on race and
(sometimes) gender but not discrimination based on class alone. Compare Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (outlawing overt race discrimination in public
education), with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973)
(refusing to extend equivalent protection to poorer school districts).
91. See Zelenak, supra note 43, at 1567-70.
92. See id. at 1563. In particular, Zelenak notes that joint tax returns may hurt black
couples more than white couples at the time of marriage (because black couples tend to
have more even incomes than white couples at that point), but joint returns may play a
stronger role in discouraging white women from later working outside the home (because
their income will then be taxed at their husbands' higher rates). See id. at 1570-71.
93. See id. at 1571-74.
94. See id. at 1563-66.
95. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax
Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967) (assessing limitations and inconsistencies of the
comprehensive tax base concept); see also Livingston, supra note 2, at 381-83 (discussing
alternative economic theories that compete with the comprehensive tax base approach).
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savings from the tax base, the same provisions would be part of the
normative tax base, and provisions imposing a tax on savings or
investment income might be said to disadvantage white taxpayers.95
Although I have not studied the area, my instinct is that Moran
and Whitford have a strong, if as yet inconclusive, argument, and that
Zelenak's criticisms are too harsh. In particular, his methodological
critique is only partly convincing. Although the idea of a
comprehensive tax base has been roundly criticized, it remains the
starting point for most analyses of the tax code, and scholars
regularly target deviations from it for criticism and reform.'
Complaining about Moran and Whitford's use of this concept is thus
somewhat unfair. It is also quite believable that, with the nationwide
electorate remaining well over one-half white, 8 Congress tends to
favor the interests of Whites over other groups in enacting tax
expenditures. Indeed, if it did not, it would probably be removed by
the voters and replaced by a Congress that did.
But even if one accepts Moran and Whitford's basic argument, a
question of priorities remains. African-Americans have significantly
lower incomes, on average, than Whites,99 a difference that is likely to
overwhelm more particular variations in the configuration of their
income or assets. Given this difference, macroscopic issues of
vertical equity-the progressivity of tax rates, the choice between an
income or consumption tax, and health care and welfare reform-are
likely to be more important to African-Americans than incremental
changes to individual tax code provisions. Even the provisions cited
by Moran and Whitford discriminate largely on the basis of class
rather than race. Thus, investment tax incentives (for example,
reduced capital gains rates) tend to favor Whites over Blacks because
the latter-even if they have the same income as Whites-have
probably had it for a shorter period of time, and typically have little
inherited wealth with which to construct a long-range investment
96. See Zelenak, supra note 43, at 1563-67.
97. See Bittker, supra note 95, at 925 ("It is no exaggeration to say that a
'comprehensive tax base'... has come to be the major organizing concept in most serious
discussions of our federal income tax structure."); Livingston, supra note 2, at 375-80
(arguing that tax scholarship continues to be strongly influenced by the Haig-Simons and
comprehensive tax base traditions).
98. Of the 193.7 million members of the voting-age population in 1996, 162.8 million
were white. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997, at 288 tbl.462.
99. Per capita income in 1995 for Whites was $18,304, while it was $10,982 for Blacks.
See id. at 474 tbl.735. Median family income in 1995 was $42,646 for Whites, while it was
$25,970 for Blacks. See id. at 469 tbl.724.
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portfolio."°  Similarly, Blacks would likely benefit less from
employee benefit tax incentives, even at equivalent income levels,
not because they are indifferent to retirement but because their lesser
wealth means they are likely to need more of their income for
immediate consumption.'0 ' I suspect that Whites of modest origins-
for example, the children of immigrants or working class families-
would find themselves in a similar financial position.
Given this situation, one cannot help but wonder if it would be
better for scholars to focus on broader issues of vertical equity,
including the progressivity of tax rates and the distributive
implications of specific incentive provisions, than to engage in a
protracted debate over whether the tax code discriminates against
African-Americans or "only" against poor people, regardless of race.
That regressive tax rules have a disproportionate effect on minorities
would be an important part of this analysis, but would not distract
attention from the underlying, multi-racial point. It may be that
Moran and Whitford agree with this approach and simply believe
that the impact upon black people is an important aspect of the
broader debate. (It is hard for a white person to tell black people
that they should refrain from worrying about black concerns.) But it
is discouraging to see black and white liberals arguing about the
particular nature of black victimization, in tax and other matters,
while both continue to be clobbered by conservatives in the real
world of policy-making. An excessive focus on race, and a relative
reluctance to confront class issues, is likely to exacerbate these
difficulties.
Some, although not all, of this analysis also applies to feminist
scholarship. Many of the points made by Staudt, Kornhauser, and
others are uniquely female in nature, and it is unlikely that men
100. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 17, at 772 tbl.3 (demonstrating that Whites
receive significantly larger inheritances than Blacks and that by the time he reaches the
age of 65, the average white American will hold property worth more than five times the
value of the property possessed by the average 65-year-old black American).
101. See id. Investment and employee benefit tax incentives present a relatively
simple issue of class (and hence racial) impact. The issue of housing is more complicated.
Blacks spend less on housing that Whites, partly because they have less money, but partly
because they are excluded from many neighborhoods in which the more desirable houses
are located. Yet even in this area there may be a tendency to overstate the degree of
racial, rather than class, discrimination. See Black, White, and Wrongheaded,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 1997, at 14, 14 ("The administration believes that the failure of
many blacks to get mortgages is race-based; but the evidence is that this prejudice is not
systematic, and in any case has little to do with the failure of blacks to enter the housing
market.... The problem is one of poverty, not race .... "); cf. Moran & Whitford, supra
note 17, at 773-83 (discussing racial impact of housing tax incentives).
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would have made them. (I cannot remember the last article by a man
about housework.) But other points are essentially humanist in
character and relate to universal concepts of equity and fairness more
than the particular interests of women taxpayers. Kornhauser is
actually rather explicit about this, utilizing feminist theory as one of a
series of arguments in favor of progressive taxation." z Staudt begins
with an avowedly feminist perspective, but modifies this somewhat
with her proposed credit for lower-income taxpayers and related
adjustments. 3 By the end of her article, she is effectively arguing on
behalf of lower- and middle-income families rather than for women
and against men.' 4 Without taking anything away from Staudt or
Kornhauser, these arguments-like those of Moran and Whitford-
might at times be more effective if made in gender- or race-neutral
terms. Certainly, a more universal approach would engender less
hostility from traditional scholars, increasing the chance for academic
(and perhaps political) success.
My issue here is not with the quality of critical tax scholarship,
but with its intellectual agenda. If critical tax scholars focus
exclusively on discrete (even if very large) groups, they run the risk
of being perpetually marginalized, making sporadic insights but
leaving the structure of the tax field essentially unchanged. But if
they can combine their diverse perspectives into a broader, more
systematic program, might they not have a more permanent impact?
Might we not see a convergence of critical and mainstream tax
scholarship, based not on the interests of competing groups, but on
principles of distributive fairness that are equally applicable to all
taxpayers? Might critical tax scholarship provide the occasion, not
for the decline of the tax field, but for its eventual revival?
102. See Kornhauser, supra note 18, at 518-22 (alluding to benefit theory and
(implicitly) the diminishing marginal utility of money together with feminist arguments
for progressivity).
103. See Staudt, supra note 18, at 1636-40.
104. By the end of her article, Staudt's argument is, at the very least, a mixture of
feminist and traditional vertical equity concerns. See id. at 1647 (emphasizing women's
"economic vulnerability" and arguing that "to improve women's economic security,
housework must be recognized as valuable and productive"). Staudt's later work has
addressed progressivity issues more explicitly. See Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of
the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919, 922 (1997) (arguing that conventional
progressivity doctrine has failed to consider adequately the rights and responsibilities of
poorer citizens).
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V. CONCLUSION: "PROGRESSIVE" TAX POLICY AND THE DANGERS
OF COMPARTMENTALIZED DISCOURSE
A discussion of the possible future agenda of critical tax
scholarship brings us back to the issue of progressivity (or vertical
equity) and its place in mainstream tax discourse. 5 There has been a
creative and diverse scholarship on progressivity for decades, asking
whether progressive tax rates are justified on political and economic
grounds and whether their benefits outweigh their costs. Scholars
have considered a variety of arguments for progressivity, ranging
from the overt redistribution of income0 ' to the diminishing marginal
utility of money'07 and the potential danger to democracy arising
from excessively unequal incomes. 0 8 More recently, some scholars
have considered the implications of contemporary legal philosophy,
as developed by John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and other scholars, and
of optimal tax and welfare economics theory.' 9 The consensus is that
the argument for progressivity remains, in the words of Walter Blum
and Harry Kalven, "stubborn but uneasy,""' 0 although a vocal
minority opposes the idea altogether."' Other scholars have moved
beyond the rate structure to consider the vertical equity implications
of tax incentives and other specific tax rules. 1 2
The scholarship on progressivity is creative and original, but it
has become in many ways out of date. It has yet to adjust fully to
many of the changes in post-Cold War America, including an
increasingly conservative political philosophy, the globalization of the
national economy, and an increasing recognition that poverty has
become concentrated among women and minority groups. Indeed
105. Once again, I am using the terms "progressivity" and "vertical equity" more or
less interchangeably, although they have somewhat different meanings and distinct (but
related) histories. See supra note 12 (discussing progressivity and vertical equity).
106. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation, 19 U. CI-. L. REV. 417, 486-506 (1952) (assessing arguments for progressive
taxation based on the overt redistribution of income).
107. See id. at 455-86 (assessing the diminishing marginal utility of money as an
argument for progressive taxation).
108. See id. at 444-51 (assessing the role of a progressive income tax in maintaining
economic and political stability).
109. See, e.g., Bankman & Griffith, supra note 12, at 1949-50 (discussing Rawlsian
philosophy and optimal tax theory); Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37
ARIz. L. REv. 739, 771-86 (1995) (applying John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald
Dworkin to the subject of progressive taxation).
110. Blum & Kalven, supra note 106, at 519.
111. See generally HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 65 (arguing for a flat tax on
fairness and efficiency grounds).
112. See generally TAXING AMERICA, supra note 4 (collecting articles that analyze the
tax system's impact on vertical equity issues).
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the debate, at least where lawyers are concerned, tends to be
conducted in an empirical vacuum, with only limited evidence
regarding the actual distribution of income and the political context
in which the tax system operates. The debate is also surprisingly self-
contained, with relatively little connection to the parallel debates in
health and welfare policy or to the increasing calls to replace gender-
and race-based affirmative action with an income-based (that is,
redistributive) program. These limitations make the argument for
progressivity less effective than it could be, and account for at least
some of the intellectual success of the flat tax movement.
Critical scholarship has a role in reversing this trend. By calling
attention to the tax treatment of women, minorities, and other
disadvantaged groups, critical scholars may help to bring the debate
over progressive taxation up to date, to encompass the treatment not
only of taxpayers at different income levels but those who belong to
more or less powerful groups in the wider society."4 Indeed, the
critical tax movement is in some ways a contemporary equivalent of
the progressive movement that created the income tax in the first
place, with the difference that class is today defined along race and
gender as well as along economic lines. The economic and social
disadvantage facing women and minorities is, after all, the reason
that we care about discrimination against them more than, for
example, discrimination between the oil and natural gas industries, or
between different types of research and development spending. That
is why efforts to approach race and gender issues using horizontal
equity analysis-by asking whether the Code treats women and
minorities differently from similarly situated white males-have a
tendency to fall rather flat. The whole point of critical scholarship is
that women and minorities are not similarly situated to white men,
and it seems more accurate to view these problems as vertical equity
or at least hybrid issues rather than as purely horizontal equity
concerns.
n5
113. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic
Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913 (1996) (evaluating merits of affording preferences
based on economic disadvantage rather than on race or other such criteria).
114. For a discussion of the limitations of conventional analyses of traditional
progressivity discourse, see Brown & Fellows, supra note 4, at 9-10, 17-20 (arguing that
progressivity theory fails to consider adequately the role of wealth as opposed to income,
the significance of tax base as opposed to tax rates, and the tax treatment of poor
individuals). Brown and Fellows suggest that these limitations make progressivity a
"contestable" proposition. Id. at 10. A better view is that they suggest the need for an
expanded, more sophisticated version of the progressivity concept.
115. Edward McCaffery is perhaps most honest about this, proposing intentionally
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An expanded concept of progressivity offers the basis for a
potential convergence between mainstream and critical scholars.
This could be a dynamic process, in which mainstream scholars take
critical perspectives into account in debating progressivity and
vertical equity issues, and critical scholars make a greater effort to
consider the implications of their work for the wider tax system. For
example, in evaluating comprehensive reform proposals-like the flat
tax or the consumption tax-traditional scholars should consider the
impact of these proposals on women, minorities, and other
disadvantaged groups as well as on economically defined income
classes. Mainstream scholars also should consider the
"femininization" of poverty, and the concentration of poverty among
minorities and immigrant groups, in evaluating the philosophical
debate between progressivity and flat tax advocates."6 Finally,
mainstream scholars should pay increased attention to the effect of
individual tax law provisions-for example, capital gains rates, the
marriage penalty, and investment and savings incentives-on these
disadvantaged categories of taxpayers. For their part, critical
scholars should consider whether at least some of their arguments
might be made as effectively in class-based terms as in race- or
gender-based terms. As Zelenak suggests, they should also try to
distinguish tax rules that involve a genuine pattern of discrimination
against women or minorities from other, more quirky provisions that
may not reflect such a pattern." 7
More broadly, the challenge posed by critical scholarship may
cause a much-needed awakening for the entire tax field. Even for
mainstream authors, the strictures of traditional tax scholarship have
become excessively confining. There is an emerging consensus on the
need for a scholarship that has more diverse goals and methods,
including empirical and narrative (as well as normative) forms, that
makes expanded use both of non-economic social science and the
insights of non-tax legal scholars, and that addresses a new and
advantageous tax treatment of women to compensate for past (and continuing)
discrimination. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 24, at 277-78 (proposing to "tax married
men more, and married women less," although arguing that this would be best achieved
by a facially.gender-neutral reform).
116. A traditional argument for progressivity is the injustice of pre-tax income
allocations, th6 case for which would appear stronger if poverty was concentrated among
discrete racial or gender groups. Cf. Blum & Kalven, supra note 106, at 486-506
(assessing the reduction of inequality as a goal of progressive taxation).
117. For example, the marriage penalty and the treatment of child care expenses
appear more systematic than the QTIP or return preparation rules. See supra note 82
(citing articles on these and other subjects).
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broader range of subject matter."8 By challenging many of the
traditional limitations of the tax field, and making extensive use of
empirical data, critical scholars help make such a scholarship
possible. That does not mean most tax scholars will suddenly turn
into "crits" or embrace radical reform proposals. But it does suggest
that critical and mainstream scholars will eventually be able to find a
common language and that it will become increasingly difficult to
dismiss critical writers as beyond the scholarly pale. This
convergence, in turn, will permit critical scholars to adopt a less
defensive tone and to make their arguments in less particularistic
terms.
My hope is that mainstream and critical scholars can create a
new progressive synthesis on tax issues, to the point that the very
label of "critical" scholar appears quaint and outdated. My fear is
that they will exhaust their energies fighting each other and have
little strength left to face the conservative onslaught. That is why the
tone of Zelenak's article causes me such concern. The legal
academy-not to mention the American Left-has suffered
immeasurable damage from the proliferation of special interest
groups, and perhaps greater damage from the angry reaction that
such groups have engendered among traditional liberal forces." 9 I
would like to see the tax field avoid this dynamic. A field organized
around universal principles of fairness and equity, with groups
competing for influence but sharing a common language and values,
seems likely to achieve much that is of lasting value. A field in which
everyone is shouting at each other is likely to come to no good.
It may be that there is an inevitable phase of anger before new
ideas are taken seriously and become part of the established order in
any field. From this perspective, the contentious nature of this
Symposium may be a sign of progress rather than a cause for alarm.
The traditional consensus on tax matters resulted not from the
acquiescence of women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups,
118. See Livingston, supra note 2, at 394-409 (calling for a change in the goals,
methods, and subject matter of contemporary tax scholarship).
119. See, e.g., Todd Gitlin, The Anti-Political Populism of Cultural Studies, DISsENT,
Spring 1997, at 77, 77 (lamenting the rise of identity politics and group-oriented "cultural
studies" and the tendency to substitute such activities for the building of effective political
coalitions and the pursuit of broad-based leftist objectives).
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but because they were not represented at all. We are far from
agreeing on everything, but at least we are all in the room.120
120. Edward McCaffery provides a rather eloquent, if idealistic, case for the value of
dialogue and (implicitly) for the consciousness-raising function of critical scholarship:
A principal lesson of contemporary social theory is that dialogue, and the
conditions of dialogue, is often the most important political mechanism.
Sometimes it is the only thing. Our discussion of gender and equality has been
hampered by the obscurity of many of the gendered forces at work. We need to
shed light on these .... We need to think more about what equality and respect
mean.
MCCAFFERY, supra note 24, at 279.
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